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Summary 
This paper deals with Belarusian agriculture and its access to financing for investment 
purposes. The current system of agricultural financing in Belarus is mainly based on 
government support that is provided through different channels. Belagroprombank as the 
prime institution of the current system fulfils the role of the government’s financial agent, 
granting loans mainly at the expense of state funds. This system of granting loans perpetuates 
soft budget constraints for Belarusian agriculture. We argue that the goals of hardening budget 
constraints for agricultural enterprises and of increasing competition and efficiency in the 
commercial banking field should define and drive policy. Some government intervention to 
make loans more affordable may be used as a temporary expedient. In particular, partial 
interest rate compensations on loans provided according to commercial criteria and by 
commercial agents would be an incentive-compatible means of increasing the access of 
agricultural enterprises to capital. The provision of loans according to the non-market criteria 
employed by Belagroprombank should be phased out as quickly as possible. 
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1. Introduction 
The Belarusian agricultural sector is the most problematic one within the national economy. 
About 60% of all agricultural enterprises make losses. The overall profitability of the sector 
was negative (-0.7%) in 2003. This suggests that a number of measures need to be taken in 
order to improve the financial stability of agricultural enterprises and to raise their ability to 
generate profits. The difficulties these enterprises face when borrowing funds is one of the 
priority problems that need to be solved in order to help future development (see Table 1). 
Table 1. Profitability of Agricultural Enterprises 
and Market Interest Rates on Newly Granted Loans 
 1H99 2H99 1H00 2H00 1H01 2H01 1H02 2H02 1H03 2H03 
Profitability 14.4 19.6 7.0 6.2 -0.1 -5.7 1.3 -2.7 -3.3 -0.7 
Nominal interest rate 77.3 90.0 96.3 79.3 73.6 64.4 63.6 48.0 39.2 29.7 
Profitability is the profitability of agricultural enterprises during the period in question. The nominal interest rate is the 
average nominal interest rate for newly granted loans. 
Source: Ministry of Statistics and National Bank of Belarus.  
Table1 shows that the overall borrowing ability of the sector is extremely low. This does not 
mean that no agricultural enterprise can afford to obtain credit at market interest rates. 
Certainly, the reticence of banks to lend to farms at market interest rates is largely a 
consequence of their low efficiencies. In other words, we face a situation where the cost of the 
loans exceeds the farms’ abilities to repay them. Hence, the best solution is to increase the 
efficiency of the agricultural enterprises so that they can compete for capital. This process 
could be aided by a thorough and fundamental agricultural policy approach dedicated to 
generating sustainable increases in the sector’s efficiency. At the same time, it is important to 
focus on the supply side of the market for loans, i.e. on the process of agricultural borrowing, 
and to consider measures that would make bank loans more affordable. In this paper we focus 
on the supply side by analyzing the existing mechanism for granting loans to the rural sector. 
We also deal with possible ways to lower risks within this mechanism. We propose reforms that 
could be implemented to increase the efficiency of the agricultural finance system in Belarus. 
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 we consider the necessity for efficient financial 
intermediation to improve the chances for more successful performance of agriculture. Section 
3 deals with the actual framework of bank lending to agricultural enterprises in Belarus. We 
identify the banks involved and to which extent they grant loans to the rural sector, what the 
sources of these funds are, and how the banks (mainly Belagroprombank) perform. In Section 
4 we describe the terms and conditions of lending to agricultural enterprises and the principal 
tools of providing subsidized access to capital. In Section 5 we evaluate the effectiveness of 
these tools and make policy recommendations that could be managed within the existing 
system. 
2. Rural Finance System Development is a Prime Factor for Raising the Performance 
of the Agricultural Sector 
Developing the finance system and financial intermediation are important elements for a 
growth strategy for the whole economy. This has been recognized by the so-called ‘new 
growth’ theory. King and Levine (1992, 1993) found that the development of the financial 
sector precedes economic development and causes growth. For this reason it is important to 
consider what the banks’ functions are, and to emphasise the importance of their efficient and 
independent operations. 
In market economies, banks and other financial intermediaries are profit-oriented enterprises 
making independent decisions. In order to attract savings on the one hand and borrowers on 
the other, they must provide attractive conditions (interest rates, periods of validity, risk 
reduction) for both of them. By using funds obtained from enterprises or private savers, banks 
make external financing available to enterprises and households - they work as financial 
intermediaries. 
Banks fulfil several additional functions. For individual savers it would be too costly to evaluate 
potential borrowers. Banks, however, have strong incentives to evaluate all potential 
investment projects properly as this is the precondition for generating profit. In this way, 
banks can reduce the risk of financing loss-making investment projects. Furthermore, they 
realize economies of scale when evaluating and later monitoring investment projects. This 
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leads to reduced costs of initiation and of monitoring the relationships between banks and 
borrowers1. 
The transformation functions of banks, their cost-reducing effects on the saver-borrower 
relationship and their ability to reduce overall economic risk in an economy are reflected in the 
so-called interest rate spread (the difference between the credit and deposit rates). The better 
the banks function, the more intense the competition between them, and the lower the overall 
economic risk, the lower the interest rate spread will be. A low interest rate spread is, of 
course, good for the economy. It implies that deposit rates are as high and credit rates as low 
as possible, ceteris paribus. Hence, saving becomes more attractive and additional funds are 
mobilized for investment, while investment becomes less expensive, spurring growth. Table 2 
shows that the average interest spread in 2002 in Belarus (15.1 percentage points) was rather 
high and its increasing trend over time is not exhibited by the other countries listed. Thus 
there is potential for improvement. 
Table 2. Interest Spread in Belarus and Other Transition Countries 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Belarus 5.2 8.4 6.8 10.8 15.7 10.3 12.1 15.1 
CIS-7 48.7 25.2 27.3 28.1 15.3 18.3 15.2 12.6 
Other CIS 63.3 38.1 20.8 23.2 29.2 25.3 15.7 13.5 
SEE 13.8 20.7 21.2 14.8 12.5 13.3 12.6 10.7 
CEE+B 9.5 8.5 6.7 6.3 6.5 6 5.4 5.3 
CIS-7 – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan; Other CIS – other CIS 
countries including Belarus; SEE – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Macedonia, Romania; 
CEE+B – Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania. 
Source: National bank; Nicolo, Geadach, Rozkov “Bridging the great divide”. 
The capital requirements of enterprises in transition economies are usually higher than in 
developed ones. Any period of high inflation leads to a reduction in the ratio of own current 
assets availability (in Belarus it dropped from 35.4% in 2000 to 1.4% in 2002), which at the 
same time results in a low ability to make capital investments using one’s own funds. A high 
interest rate spread makes it even harder for enterprises to make the necessary investments. 
3. The Organizational Framework of the Agricultural Finance System in Belarus 
Three banks dominate the agricultural finance system in Belarus. They are Belagroprombank, 
Belarusbank and Priorbank, which hold about 70%, 18% and 7% respectively of the total 
amount of loans granted to agriculture. The second and third banks listed can be left out of the 
following analysis. Though they hold significant shares of loans to agriculture, these loans are 
not very significant within their total portfolios (loans to the agricultural sector make up about 
15% of the credit portfolio for Priorbank and only about 3% for Belarusbank). 
Chart 1 presents a graphical overview of the Belarusian agricultural finance system. The 
government and the banking sector are the main donors. Using this Chart we can separate the 
direct government financing from the indirect government financing (via the banks), which is 
the object of our analysis. 
The first peculiarity of the system is the government’s choice of borrowers. According to NBB 
statistics, agriculture was granted BYR 463.1 bn of loans of which BYR 322.5 bn or 69.6% 
were provided based on presidential or government instructions backed by corresponding legal 
acts. Besides, agricultural enterprises were granted a share of the BYR 1409.5 bn of loans 
administratively initiated for wage payments2. Thus, 75% is a lower bound estimate of the 
share of loans for agricultural enterprises initiated by the government, which illustrates the 
crowding out of market capital from the lending market for agriculture. 
                                          
1 Vincentz, V & W. Quaisser (1998) “Factors of growth in transition countries”, Eastern European-Institute Munich, 
Working Paper № 211. 
2 This figure is given for all branches of the Belarusian economy and there is no data on what share of these loans was 
directed at the rural sector. 
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Chart 1. The System of Granting Loans to Agricultural Enterprises 
 
Where: 1 – loans granted to agricultural enterprises by Belagroprombank; 2 – flow of government’s funds to 
Belagroprombank in the form of replenishment of its authorized capital, interest rate compensation, etc.; 3 - emission 
loans by the NBB to the government, which are then redirected towards the authorized capital of Belagroprombank 
(was used before 2004); 4 - deposits by households and legal entities with Belagroprombank; 5 – preferential 
treatment of Belagroprombank compared with other banks, concerning reserve requirements, terms of refinancing and 
deposit insurance; 6 – direct financing, budget loans and grants to agricultural enterprises and subsidies by the state. 
The second peculiarity is the government’s decision concerning the terms of the loans and the 
interest rates (see Appendix 1). There is a lack of disaggregated official statistics on the 
interest rates of these loans, but we may conclude (assuming that all loans granted at a rate 
higher than the NBB’s refinancing rate are market loans) that the share of market loans in 
total lending to agricultural enterprises was close to zero in recent years. 
The most important institution within the current system of granting loans is 
Belagroprombank. The government’s share in its authorized fund is about 99%. The share of 
loans to agriculture in the bank’s credit portfolio fluctuates around 55%. The rest of 
Belagroprombank’s portfolio is in other sectors and tends to perform better that the 
agricultural part of the portfolio, resulting in some cross-subsidization of the bank’s agricultural 
lending activities. Policy makers are convinced that agriculture in Belarus is in need of 
government financing at concessionary conditions, and Belagroprombank is ordered to provide 
this finance. Thus Belagroprombank is not an independent market oriented agent, but rather 
an institution that acts as the government’s financial agent for agriculture. 
To fulfil its duty given agriculture’s poor financial performance, Belagroprombank needs access 
to inexpensive refinancing. This has resulted in the use of equity capital as the main source of 
its asset operations. Therefore, some financial indices of Belagroprombank differ strongly from 
those of other banks. The equity multiplier (EM) ratio for Belagroprombank was only 1.7 as of 
April 1st; while the average ratio for the other authorized banks (excluding Belagroprombank) 
is 6.7 (for a developed universal bank this ratio is usually between 10 and 15). The structure 
of equity capital is based on the authorized capital that forms 83% of it. Thus, 
Belagroprombank does not primarily channel capital obtained from savings into the agricultural 
market. In order to execute the government’s instructions it needs a steady inflow of 
inexpensive funds from other sources. 
As illustrated in Chart 1, the system of financing comprises many channels. Many measures 
are needed to maintain this complicated system of state-owned agricultural enterprises and 
banks. It is necessary to attract nearly all the forms of support for the banks as direct financial 
inflows from the state and indirect legal measures. Channel 4 (traditional source for granting 
loans) and Channel 6 (direct financing of agriculture by the government) exist in any economy 
and do not create many distortions within the system of agricultural finance. The impact of 
channel 5 is rather significant, but this tool is used not only in regard to the agricultural 
finance. In order to analyze the concrete schemes of granting loans, we will select only those 
measures that are most significant from the point of view of volume. Among them three 
important tools for subsidizing capital for agriculture stand out: a) providing subsidized loans 
(directing funds into the bank’s authorized capital) for banks (channels 2,3 in Chart 1); b) 
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interest rate compensations (channel 2 in Chart 1); and c) administrating and discharging 
government guarantees (channel 2, in Chart 1). 
4. The Lending Procedures For Agricultural Enterprises 
As a first stage, every lending procedure includes such aspects as funding and originating a 
loan. Originating a loan should include a borrower’s applying for a loan and a bank’s consent to 
grant it.  However, in actual practise the government takes upon itself both of these functions 
through following procedures: 
A) Providing subsidized loans 
This scheme is organized as follows: The government notices the agricultural enterprises’ 
financial problems and decides to finance certain of their activities. This may concern a specific 
enterprise or a group of enterprises that need financing, or it may involve a government 
program for all agricultural enterprises that meet certain requirements (for instance the 
acquisition of tractors and agricultural machinery described in Appendix 1, item 1). After the 
appropriate legal act is passed, Belagroprombank is ordered to service the programs or to give 
loans to specific enterprises at given interest rates and terms. In order for Belagroprombank to 
be able to execute these government orders the legal act foresees supplemental payments by 
the government to the authorized fund of Belagroprombank3. The source of these funds may 
be the Fund for Agricultural Producer’s Support (agricultural fund)4. More often these funds are 
not provided for in any budgeted expenditure item, hence the budget item “deposits and share 
payments” is corrected (increased) and the resulting deficit is then financed in one of two 
ways. The first alternative is for the NBB to issue a loan to the government. This was the usual 
procedure before 2004. The second is an increase in government borrowing by emitting 
government securities, which are mainly bought by Belagroprombank. 
Regardless of the source of the funds, we can classify this tool as a quasi-fiscal operation 
amounting to direct financing of the agricultural enterprises by the state. The scope of this 
scheme is significant. During 2003, the authorized capital of Belagroprombank was increased 
by BYR 333.0 bn. This sum should be reduced somewhat, because some funds were provided 
to Belagroprombank in order to grant loans for rural home building. But even after this 
correction at least 50% of all loans granted to agricultural enterprises were actually quasi-
fiscal financing5. 
B) Interest rate compensation 
These are considered to be subsidies to the agricultural enterprises and a form of interest 
income for the banks. According to the Instruction by Minselhozprod “On the way of using 
funds of the agricultural fund in 2004”6, the agricultural fund is the source of the interest rate 
compensation for enterprises. The interest rate compensation procedure operates as follows. A 
listing exists of all enterprises that were granted loans with interest rate compensation 
according to certain legal acts by the President and the government, in which the fixed part of 
the interest rate for compensation is defined. A portion of funds provided for compensation and 
certain beneficiaries are approved in this case. Another portion is transferred to the local 
executive committees who then define the beneficiaries and the rate of compensation for each 
particular beneficiary. Among the potential beneficiaries are those agricultural enterprises that 
have accomplished certain activities mentioned in the government’s Regulation “On the 
measures for preparation of the agricultural enterprises to fieldwork”, which is a necessary 
condition for receiving compensation. Compensation is provided according to the residual 
principle, i.e. the local authorities can provide compensation only within the funds granted by 
the expenditure plan. If an enterprise fulfils all the requirements of the Regulation but there 
are no more funds available, the local authority (or enterprise) cannot apply for more funds 
                                          
3 In some cases the increase in the authorized fund may be accomplished ex post. This means that the first step is to 
provide Belagroprombank with funds in the form of government loans or to allocate deposits to this bank and to issue 
the corresponding orders to grant loan to particular borrowers. Later these resources are transformed into government 
payments to the authorized capital of the bank. 
4 According to legislation (Appendix 1, item 5) the agricultural fund includes funds in the form of capital transfers for 
increasing the government’s share in the authorized fund of Belagroprombank. In 2003 this sum was BYR 78.4 bn, in 
2004 BYR 31.0 bn. 
5 Of the above-mentioned 75% share of the state in all loans provided to agricultural enterprises, 66% can be 
considered quasi-fiscally financed. 
6 An instruction released in 2003 included similar regulations. 
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from the government. Compared with subsidized loans, interest rate compensation required 
relatively fewer funds in recent years. In 2003, the agricultural fund included BYR 51.675 bn 
for interest rate compensation and BYR 46.000 bn in 2004. 
C) The granting of state guarantees 
The provision of state guarantees is regulated in the Regulation “On the way of administrating 
the government’s guarantees”. In practise it is quite similar to the previous procedure. State 
guarantees are provided for export-oriented or for import substitution activities, for activities 
connected to new technologies and for home building. The guarantees can be administered by 
the central government through the Ministry of Agriculture and Food (it administrates mainly 
guarantees for foreign lenders) or by a local authority to which the guarantee sums are 
transferred by Ministry of Finance, and which then becomes the body providing the 
guarantees. Providing state guarantees is quite rare and is mainly used when borrowing from 
abroad. The total sum of the funds anticipated for discharging guarantees in 2004 is BYR 79.02 
bn, of which BYR 48 bn is foreseen for guarantees to foreign lenders. In addition, part of the 
BYR 10.40 bn expenditure item “granting loans” in the agricultural fund may be spent for this 
purposes. In 2003 agricultural fund did not contain any expenditure item for guarantees: they 
were administrated based on the “granting loans” item that totalled BYR 31.47 bn. Thus the 
scope of this instrument is relatively limited within Belarusian agriculture. 
Taken together, these mechanisms result in low interest rates for agriculture7 as a whole and 
on loans granted by Belagroprombank compared to loans by other banks (see Table 3). 
Table 3. Nominal Interest Rates in 2003 by Loan User and Originating Bank 
 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
Loans to agriculture 10.9 11.1 11.4 11.7 12.0 11.9 11.4 10.3 10.0 9.8 9.2 9.0 
Loans to all sectors 33.4 32.9 32.5 31.7 30.8 29.3 27.7 25.8 24.6 23.7 22.4 22.3 
Loans by Belagroprombank 21.9 21.6 21.3 21.2 20.5 18.8 17.9 16.6 15.8 15.7 15.6 15.7 
Loans by Priorbank 43.6 42.7 43.6 42.7 41.8 39.3 39.1 37.2 33.9 31.8 30.2 29.2 
Loans by Belagazprombank 55.0 51.7 49.9 48.6 47.3 43.3 40.0 39.1 38.0 34.4 33.1 32.6 
Loans by all banks 27.9 27.5 27.1 26.5 25.8 24.8 23.8 22.2 21.4 20.8 20.0 19.9 
Source: National Bank. 
Besides lower interest rates, the repayment of loans provided via the schemes outlined above 
is often not enforced; hence many agricultural enterprises treat their loans not as such, but 
rather as subsidies. According to official statistics, problem loans do not account for a major 
share of loans to agriculture. During 2002-2003 problem loans amounted to 7.3% of all 
outstanding loans on average (24.9% on short-term loans and 0.9% on loan-term loans). The 
absolute value of problem loans was rather stable throughout the period (it fluctuated between 
BYR 20,0 bn and 37,0 bn), while the stock of outstanding loans increased substantially (from 
BYR 259,0 bn on January 1st, 2002 to BYR 629,7 bn on January 1st, 2004). Thus the share of 
problem loans was falling through the period (8,0% on January 1st, 2002) and amounted to 
4.9% on January 1st, 2004 (18.3% and 0.6% for short and long-term loans respectively). 
However, these statistics are distorted by the fact that loans are often forgiven (or repaid by 
the government, see for instance Appendix 1, items 4 and 7) and terms of repayment are 
often changed to the benefit of agricultural enterprises. 
Hence, an important outcome of the current system is that agricultural managers are provided 
with soft budget constraints8 and have few incentives to maintain financial discipline. The most 
important behavioural effect of this on the enterprises is the reduced managerial effort to 
maximize profits. The incentives to innovate and develop new technologies and products are 
also reduced. Rather than wooing customers, sellers concentrate on winning the favour of 
potential supporting organizations (government). There is less need to attend to relative prices 
on the output or input side if the difference between revenue and expenditure is no longer 
critical. The ability to buy inputs without footing the bill, knowing that the government will 
eventually look after it, inflates the demand for these inputs. This system also engenders poor 
                                          
7 According to reasonable estimates, the average interest rate of 10.7% for loans to agriculture in 2003 was about 1/3 
of the interest rate that would allow a bank’s to cover all of the expenses associated with extending a loan with zero 
profit. 
8 See Kornai, Maskin, Roland (2002) “Understanding Soft Budget Constraint”, Princeton Institute for Advanced Study, 
Economic Working Paper № 19. 
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repayment morale on the part of agricultural managers; they are ‘spoiled’ and thus become 
less attractive customers for commercial lenders9  
5. Certain Measures That Would Make Commercial Credit More Affordable for 
Agricultural Enterprises 
Hardening budget constraints (i.e. eliminating subsidized loans) would ensure that the scarce 
capital and investment flows to agricultural enterprises would be put to the best possible uses. 
The current system of soft budget constraints crowds out market capital and leads to a 
considerable waste of capital. Any plan of attracting banking capital into agriculture is 
unrealistic as long as state subsidies destroy the motivation for banks and agricultural 
enterprises to come to terms and to develop an agricultural lending system based on market 
incentives. Eliminating this distortion should be a clear long-term policy priority in Belarus. 
Measures should be taken to alleviate the main weaknesses in the Belarusian banking sector10. 
Among them, the reduction of the state’s ownership in the banking system, attracting foreign 
capital11 to the sector, and the elimination of preferences for state banks should be priority 
measures. This would enhance competition and hence increase the efficiency of the banking 
sector, contributing to lower interest rate spreads and more affordable loans for agriculture. 
However, such fundamental reforms require time, and a sudden ‘shock’ hardening of budget 
constraints would likely have severely disruptive impacts on agriculture in Belarus12. Hence, 
while especially distorting and inefficient measures such as the state-directed provision of 
subsidized loans by Belagroprombank should be phased out as quickly as possible, more 
efficient forms of support that are compatible with market incentives for both banks and 
agricultural enterprises could be emphasized and expanded at least for an interim period. 
Interest rate compensation is such a form of support and should be employed as the main tool 
for subsidizing capital inputs to agriculture. Any agricultural enterprise should be able to apply 
for interest rate compensation for loans from any commercial bank that it might choose to 
borrow from. This would enable the government to increase the supply of capital to agriculture 
while at the same time encouraging competition between banks and ensuring that money is 
only provided to enterprises that can convince a commercial lender that they are likely to 
make an efficient use of it. 
What might be the main characteristics of such a scheme? First, the lower bound of interest 
rates to be paid by agricultural enterprises needs to be defined. For example, it could be 
announced that interest rates on commercial loans to agricultural enterprises will be subsidized 
to the level of the ½ of the NBB refinancing rate and no lower, without exceptions. Second, the 
government should announce how much public money is available for interest rate 
compensation. This amount could be based on the experience of previous years. We suggest 
that the volume of funds that have been provided to Belagroprombank for subsidized loans in 
past years be reallocated to the more efficient interest rate compensation scheme. 
The procedure of lending itself could look like this: Initially an enterprise applies for a loan to a 
commercial bank. After all conditions have been agreed to, the enterprise would apply to the 
local authority, suggesting an interest rate compensation ratio (not more than ½ of the NBB 
refinancing rate) that should be as low as possible. The local authorities would then rank and 
approve the applications that they have received based only on the value of the interest rate 
to be paid, as bid by the agricultural enterprises. The higher the interest rate that the 
enterprise proposes to pay itself (i.e. the lower the compensation it requests), the more likely 
that its request will be approved. The total amount of compensation must be within the total 
sum transferred to the local authority in question, and cannot be increased even if the sum of 
all requests is greater. As a result, those enterprises that are ready to pay higher interest rates 
themselves will be ‘rewarded’ with compensation, which will push all enterprises to compete 
for capital and hence strive for higher profitability. 
                                          
9 Other sources of soft budget constraints for agricultural enterprises are discussed in GET-IPM PP/4/03  “Subsidizing 
agriculture in Belarus: declared objective and actual outcomes” (section 3). 
10 For relevant information see GET-IPM PP/1/03 “Belarus’ accession to the WTO: The banking services dimension” 
(section2). 
11 See GET-IPM PP/1/04 “Should branches of foreign banks be allowed to operate in Belarus”. 
12 For relevant information see Che (2000) “Soft budget constraints, pecuniary externality, and the dual track system”, 
William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Business School, WP № 261.  
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The last aspect that defines the basis of the system of interest compensation is the beneficiary 
of the compensation. The current legislation allows a transfer to the agricultural enterprise or 
to the bank as being equally acceptable. We suggest that banks should be the recipients. First, 
if the total amount of the subsidy is received before the end of the loan period then there is 
greater scope for abuse. An enterprise that has already received the compensation could direct 
it to other purposes than interest repayments to the bank. Second, if the bank receives the 
compensation right away and directly from the state, the risk or providing loans that it 
perceives could be somewhat reduced, which may stimulate the bank to grant further loans. 
Thus, in our opinion the interest rate compensation should be transferred entirely to the 
banks, not to enterprises. 
In closing, we repeat that these recommendations focus only on the supply side of the 
agricultural finance equation. This focus should not detract from the fact that the demand side 
– i.e. making agricultural enterprises more profitable and putting them in positions to secure 
and service loans - poses equally important policy priorities. Agricultural policy can contribute 
to improving the demand side by, among other things, privatising land so that farms will be 
able to provide collateral for loans, creating a credit registry so that lenders will have access to 
fair and impartial information on a potential customer’s credit history, and establishing 
bankruptcy procedures so that borrowers have an incentive to generate profits and repay 
loans. Liberalizing agricultural markets, relieving agricultural enterprises from the burden of 
the social sphere, and giving farm managers the freedom to restructure their enterprises and 
determine their own patterns and methods of production would all enhance the ability of 
agricultural enterprises to generate profits and thus attract and service loans. 
Recommendations 
1. Establishing hard budget constraints within the Belarusian agricultural sector 
should be defined as a long-term agricultural policy priority. 
2. Thorough reforms in the agricultural and banking sectors should be initiated to 
enhance competition and efficiency on both the demand and the supply sides of 
the agricultural finance market.  
3. Quasi-fiscal financing of the agricultural sector should be reduced. The steady 
replenishment of the authorized capital of Belagroprombank through the state 
should be ended. 
4. Interest rate compensation should become the main tool of the state’s system of 
agricultural financing over the short-term. This system should be redefined to 
increase competition between enterprises and between banks and should allow 
enterprises to choose their lending institutions freely. 
5. Interest rate compensation should be paid to the banks and not to agricultural 
enterprises. This would slightly reduce the risks banks carry and thus give them a 
slight extra incentive to provide loans to agricultural enterprises. 
 
Dzmitry Kruk, Stefan von Cramon-Taubadel 
Lector: Irina Tochitskaya 
Minsk, June 2004 
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Appendix 1. Basic Legal Acts concerning the Provision of Funds for Agriculture in 
2002-2003 
№ Type of legal act Number and date Short description 
1 Regulation by the Council 
of Ministers 
№1563 of 13.11.2002 Belagroprombank is ordered to grant loans to solvent 
agricultural enterprises for the acquisition of tractors and 
machinery. The loans should be granted at 4% for seven 
years. The Ministry of Finance is ordered to budget for funds 
to replenish Belagroprombank’s authorized capital over the 
next years. 
2 Edict by President №608 of 16.12.2002 Changes to the structure of expenditures of the Fund of 
Agricultural Producers Support. Replenishment of the 
authorized capital of Belagroprombank by BYR 92.0 bn (BYR 
88.0 bn from NBB loans, BYR 4.0 bn at the expense of the 
Agricultural Fund). 
3 Regulation by the Council 
of Ministers 
№1817 of 27.12.2002 Implementation of the presidential edict №608. BYR 20.0 bn 
are granted to Belagroprombank by the NBB for acquisition 
of agricultural production. Previously granted state loans of 
BYR 4.0 bn are considered to be the government’s share in 
the authorized fund. 
4 Regulation by the Council 
of Ministers 
№1838 of 30.12.2002 Authorization of state loans for a list of enterprises to repay 
loans granted by Belarusian banks to these enterprises under
government guarantees. In total USD 4.1 m plus BYR 2.1 bn 
were granted. The state loans are to be repaid by 
01.01.2005 at an interest rate equal to ¼ of the NBB 
refinancing rate. 
5 Regulation by the Council 
of Ministers 
№638 of 14.05.2003 Granting BYR 78.4 bn to Belagroprombank. These funds are 
intended for agricultural enterprises to acquire agricultural 
machinery. During the second half of 2003 the authorized 
capital of Belagroprombank should be replenished with these 
funds.  
6 Regulation by the Council 
of Ministers 
№689 of 26.05.2003 Recommendation to the authorized banks to grant loans to 
poultry-farms at the NBB refinancing rate for 5 years.  
7 Edict by President №341 of 31.07.2003 Granting BYR 52.9 bn (not anticipated in the annual budget) 
of state loans to agricultural enterprises, which are to be 
used for the repayment of loans previously made to these 
enterprises by the banks. The budget deficit is to be financed 
through new government bonds, which are to be sold directly
to the authorized banks. Order to the authorized banks to 
grant BYR 117.7 bn loans (during the second half of 2003) to 
agricultural enterprises at ½ of the NBB refinancing rate, 
granting state guarantees on these loans and compensation 
of ½ of the refinancing rate. 
8 Regulation by the Council 
of Ministers 
№1477/26 of 31.07.200Granting BYR 12.2 bn of state loans to Belagroprombank (not
anticipated in the annual budget). The bank is to grant loans 
for this sum for acquiring agricultural machinery at 4% over 
seven years. The funds should be used to replenish the 
authorized capital of Belagroprombank. The budget deficit is 
to be financed via new government bonds, sold directly to 
the authorized banks. 
9 Edict by President №601 of 30.12.2003 Replenishment of Belagroprombank’s authorized capital by 
BYR 65.0 bn. 
10 Edict by President №602 of 30.12.2003 Change in the structure of expenditures of the Agricultural 
Fund. Order to replenish the authorized fund of 
Belagroprombank according to Regulation №638 of 
14.05.2003. 
11 Edict by President №607 of 31.12.2003 Change in the plan of the consolidated state expenditures. 
Order to the NBB to allow the government to emit new loans. 
The funds should be redirected to replenish the authorised 
funds of Belagroprombank and Belarusbank at BYR 131.1 bn 
and BYR 13.5 respectively. 
12 Regulation by the Council 
of Ministers 
№1726 of 31.12.2003 Implementation of presidential edicts № 601, 602 and 607. 
Transfer of BYR 274.4 bn to the authorized capital of 
Belagroprombank. 
 
